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Abstract
Botnets are a significant threat to computer networks and data stored on networked
computers. The ability to inhibit communication between servers controlling the botnet
and individual hosts would be an effective countermeasure. The objective of this
research was to find vulnerabilities in Unreal IRCd that could be used to shut down the
server. Analysis revealed that Unreal IRCd is a very mature and stable IRC server and no
significant vulnerabilities were found. While this research does not eliminate the
possibility that a critical vulnerability is present in the Unreal IRCd software, none were
identified during this effort.
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An Analysis of Botnet Vulnerabilities

I. Introduction
1.1 Background
Bots are software agents designed to automatically perform tasks. Examples
include web-spiders that catalog the Internet and bots found in popular online games.
Hackers use bots to infect and control large numbers of computers called a botnet
[BSA07]. An expert recently called botnets the “No.1 emerging Internet threat [Sie07].”
Botnets are responsible for 80% of e-mail spam and can be used for much more devious
and destructive purposes [Sie07]. Botmasters are able to harness the computing power
of thousands of geographically separated machines to launch distributed denial of service
(DDOS) attacks against critical computer systems and to harvest data from unsuspecting
victims.
1.2 Problem Statement
Currently, the Air Force and Department of Defense do not have an effective
defense against a botnet attack. Current prevention techniques focus on vulnerability
patching while commercial antivirus products and network sensors are used for detection.
Furthermore, the logistics of vulnerability patching leave a window of opportunity for
bots to gain a foothold on government networks while infected systems on nongovernment networks can be used to launch DDOS attacks and paralyze vital network
assets. Remediation of infected computers on privately owned computers is impractical
1

as a defense measure. Therefore, an attack on the botnet controller itself may be the most
expedient means to thwart a botet attack.
1.3 Research Objectives
The objective of this research is to discover methods that can be used to counter
the botnet threat without having to identify and clean infected computers. Botmasters are
able to infect new computers at a much faster rate than administrators can remediate
them, rendering cleaning methods ineffective. This research focuses on shutting down
the command and control portion of botnets. Since bots must connect to an Internet Relay
Chat server to receive instructions and updates or to transfer data mined from the host, a
methodology that can interrupt communication between the controller and bots would be
an effective countermeasure against attacks and could be used to prevent data exchange.
1.4 About this Document
This document is divided into five main chapters. This chapter provides an
introduction to the research subject and a brief discussion of the problem. Chapter 2
provides background information and an overview of current research related to the
subject area. Chapter 3 covers the methodology used for research and data collection.
The results of the experiments and an analysis of the data is contained in Chapter 4
followed by conclusions drawn from the research and future research topics in Chapter 5.
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II. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This section contains a brief overview of bots, internet relay chat, Unreal IRCd,
dynamic domain name system, and current bot detection methods. It is followed by a
detailed discussion of software testing and analysis as a means of vulnerability
identification. Common code vulnerabilities and exploits are also discussed. The last
section covers current research in the area of botnet countermeasures.
2.2 Bots
A bot is a script or executable file designed to perform certain functions
automatically [Pur03]. Legitimate bots help maintain Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels
and catalog the web for search engines. Illegitimate bots, the focus of this research, are
designed for malicious purposes. Bots are distinguished from other malicious code like
viruses and worms by a communication channel linking them with a controller [CJM05].
Multiple bots directed by a single controller are called a botnet. Easy to use bot “kits” are
available on the Internet which can be configured by users with limited programming
skills [Pur03]. Furthermore, bots do not have a particular infection mechanism, but use
the same methods as other malware. Typically, they take advantage of well-known
unpatched vulnerabilities to spread [Hon05]. Virtually all bots contain mechanisms to
scan networks for vulnerable hosts and infect new victims. After a successful
exploitation, a bot uses a file transfer protocol to upload itself to the compromised host,
starts itself, and tries to connect to its server [Hon05]. Bots are popular because their
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flexibility means they can be used for many different purposes. One of the most common
malicious uses of botnets is to launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks.
DDOS attacks are much more effective and difficult to counter because multiple hosts are
involved. Bots may also use infected computers as proxies for spam or phishing emails.
Some bots harvest email addresses from hosts. One of the advantages of bots is they can
download updates or place other software such as keyloggers or sniffers onto infected
systems. Another characteristic of bots is self-propagation. The most vulnerable and
desired target hosts are lightly monitored, high bandwidth, home or university computers
or servers [Pur03]. Home users moving from low bandwidth dial-up connections to
higher bandwidth cable and DSL connections have dramatically increased the number of
high value targets available to bot masters [Pur03].
2.3 Internet Relay Chat
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) is the protocol of choice for communication between a
bot controller and its agents. “IRC provides a simple, low-latency, widely available, and
anonymous command and control channel for botnet communication” [CJM05]. The
default port for IRC is 6667 and IRC servers normally listen on ports 6000-7000. The
IRC protocol (RFC 1459) was designed so users of bulletin boards could communicate
during the early days of the Internet. The IRC protocol uses TCP for communication
between clients and servers because of its reliability [OiR93]. Furthermore, the wide
ranging popularity of IRC networks and services help attackers to obscure their activities
and evade detection [Pur03]. IRC servers are freely available, easy to set up, and many
attackers have years of IRC experience [Hon05]. IRChelp.org is a help site for users
4

unfamiliar with IRC, and the following summarizes IRC operation [Van91]. Users
connect to an IRC server via a client program and join a channel. A “channel” is similar
to a chat room and divides the users into groups based on discussion topics. Messages on
a channel may be designated public or private. IRC channel names begin with a pound
sign (#) if they are shared among servers or an ampersand (&) if they are confined to a
single server. The /Server irc.ais.net command connects to the server irc.ais.net. An
important capability of IRC leveraged by bots is the ability to send and receive files.
DCC Send and DCC Get transfer files between clients. Once a bot is installed on a
victim machine, it automatically joins the channel specified by the bot master and waits
for commands.
2.4 Unreal IRC
Most bot masters use either Unreal IRCd or Conference Room. [Hon05]. Unreal
IRCd is a freely available open source IRC server that is available in Windows and Linux
versions. Unreal IRCd is popular among bot masters because it is easily customized and
very flexible. Bot masters may alter the server used by the bots in their network, and
commands can be customized so that some are not supported or even follow the RFC
specification. Common modifications include not using "JOIN", "PART" and "QUIT"
messages to cut down on traffic and removing support for the commands "LUSERS" and
"RPL_ISUPPORT" to limit information gathering attempts [Hon05]. Since Unreal IRCd
is open source, the code can be examined for vulnerabilities that may be exploited to stop
bot attacks.
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Unreal IRCd is a robust IRC daemon that provides users with many features. It is
compatible with Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) so communications can be encrypted. It
includes defenses against Trojans, a spam filter, and flood protection. One of the most
valuable features of Unreal IRCd is the ability to add modules. Around 50 modules are
available to enhance the security and/or functionality of the server. Since the server is
open source, third party modules are also available. One module is for cloaking.
Cloaking allows the user hostnames of a client to be hidden from other users [Var06].
This required prevents users from flooding each other since they cannot see the real
hosts/IPs [Var06].
A review of open source vulnerability lists reveals the types of vulnerabilities that
have previously been discovered in Unreal IRCd. Secunia reported a vulnerability that
would allow a denial of service due to improperly handling temporary kill line (TKL)
commands [Sec06]. Kill lines (k-lines) are used by operators to ban users from a server.
This list is checked before any connections are allowed. Unreal IRCd does not filter
input from trusted, or “linked,” servers which must be specified in the configuration file.
This vulnerability, fixed in release 3.2.4, required that the server exploited be linked to
the attacking server. While this vulnerability required the servers to be linked, which
implies trust between the operators of the respective servers; this suggests that all
command inputs should be tested to prevent similar attacks. Improper checking of user
input is common software vulnerability. Securiteam reported a vulnerability similar to
the TKL vulnerability with the JOIN command that could cause a server to crash, but
again required the server to be linked to the attacker’s server [Sky06]. In this same
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bulletin, the svsnick command did not check for illegal characters [Sky06]. These
vulnerabilities emphasize the need for proper input checking and provide an early focus
for testing and analysis. The other vulnerability widely reported was in the cloaking
algorithm [Sec06]. A weakness in the algorithm could allow an attacker to discover other
users IP addresses. This vulnerability poses a risk to users connecting to an Unreal IRCd
server, but does not suggest possible ways to exploit the server.
2.5 Dynamic DNS
A bot master may use Dynamic Domain Name Service (DDNS) or multiple
channels to maintain access to their botnet [Pur03]. DDNS allows users who do not have
a static IP to maintain DNS records for their servers [Smi02]. A service provider
maintains a database of current IP addresses and sends updates whenever the server
address changes. Botmasters run these servers on their home computer or a victim
computer to avoid public IRC servers. If they do use a public IRC server, they can
update the DDNS records if they are banned from one server and change to another.
Server operators ban any users or channels suspected of malicious bot activity. Since the
DNS records are updated frequently, records are cached for a very short time. This
forces all bot clients to perform DNS queries frequently which may be an avenue for
detection [CWD05].
2.6 Detection Methods
Current bot detection and removal methods are not very effective. Anti-virus
products are currently the best defense against bots, but are always playing catch up
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because they rely on signatures to identify malware. One of the difficulties is that bots
are easily modified and once modified often evade detection by anti-virus signatures.
Symantec documented 6,542 variants of Spybot during the last half of 2005 [Sym06].
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) often use common IRC commands for signatures to
detect bot traffic on a network. Thus, networks that allow IRC traffic will produce a high
false positive rate. Bots using non-standard ports have been documented [CJM05].
Encrypting command and control traffic or using nonstandard ports could hinder
detection. “Attackers can make small modifications that make detection nearly
impossible. For example, encrypting traffic, masking flow behavior with random noise,
and even switching to different communication topologies can make detection immensely
more challenging (e.g., versions of AgoBot with SSL encryption have been reported). In
the end, any approach that relies on directly detecting command and control traffic can be
defeated by changing the mode or behavior of the communication” [CJM05]. Since
botnet detection is ineffective in preventing attacks, other means of countering the threat
are needed.
2.7 Infiltration
To infiltrate a bot network, key pieces of information are needed. The IP address
of the botnet server, or its IRC channel name and password [Hon05]. This information
can be captured when the bot tries to connect to its master, or by analyzing the source
code of the bot. With this information, an IRC client that is infiltrating a bot network can
connect to the botnet. However, since the client will not respond to commands from the
botmaster, it is possible the botmaster will detect this. Larger botnets increase the
8

likelihood of remaining anonymous. Disabling auto response messages is one way to
avoid detection [Hon05]. Once connected, a client can log all message traffic between
the controller and clients and thus provide intelligence on the workings and intent of
botnets. Still, this does not provide a means of stopping a threat.
2.8 Vulnerability Identification
Once a botnet has been detected and infiltrated, a method is needed to shut it
down. Botnets depend on the controller to relay instructions and coordinate attacks, so
shutting down the controller can prevent attacks. As part of this research, the source code
for Unreal IRCd is examined to find vulnerabilities that can be used to stop attacks.
Static analysis tools are used to review source code. Any tools that examine the
source code without running it are considered “static” analysis tools. Automated tools
are available that provide a security audit on source code. Even so, manual methods are
still needed to verify any vulnerability found by code checkers.
One of the most well-known and most exploited vulnerabilities is buffer
overflows. A buffer overflow occurs when a program attempts to read or write data
outside of the bounds allocated for the data. For Unreal IRCd all input vectors need to be
verified to ensure that proper bounds checking occurs prior to memory access. Any calls
using C “string” functions should also be checked to see if improper formatting can cause
an overflow. Assuming that a string is null terminated when, in fact, it is not could result
in an overflow. Also, using multi-byte width encoding formats could bypass rudimentary
bounds checks and cause an overflow.
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Format string vulnerabilities are a common issue in programs written in C. In C,
strings are printed using a format string such as %d or %f that substitutes a variable value
for the %d and %f. There are two problems with this. First, C does not check for
missing variable arguments. If no arguments are passed to the printf function, it will pull
values off the stack. This could allow an attacker to access stack data. The second
problem occurs when a programmer does not check input data for correct formatting
before using printf or another string function. This can lead to serious consequences. By
including formatting strings in the input data, an attacker could direct printf to write code
to memory and execute it which could allow an attacker to gain complete control of the
vulnerable program [New00]. Unreal IRCd source code is checked for calls to string
functions that use data supplied by the clients that an attacker could manipulate.
A problem similar to format string vulnerabilities is input validation
vulnerabilities and code injection that takes advantage of these vulnerabilities. A
program that receives input from untrusted sources may be vulnerable if the inputs are
not thoroughly checked to ensure the inputs are formatted correctly, are of the correct
length, and do not contain metacharacters that may be interpreted as code rather than
data.
Resource exhaustion and memory management vulnerabilities are common in
software. Common targets include memory and CPU resources. If legitimate users are
unable to communicate with the server, a denial of service is successful. Can an attacker
posing as a client send a flood of JOIN requests to the Unreal IRC server and prevent bot
clients from connecting? If clients are using SSH to communicate with the server, will
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large encrypted requests overwhelm the server? Memory management holes may also be
exploited. Can resources allocated for logging be overwhelmed by sending a flood of
malformed packets? Will this prevent the administrator from identifying the real attack?
Trust relationships often provide an attack vector. Previously discovered
vulnerabilities in Unreal were exploitable because of the trust relationship between linked
servers. Can an attacker use Unreal server to link to the target Unreal server and take
advantage of the trust relationship to crash or take over the server? Can a client take
advantage of privileges gained by authenticating to the server to exploit it?
Authentication data is hardcoded into bots, so login information may be obtained if
needed to exploit a server.
2.9 Related Research
Current research on botnets is focused on improving techniques to detect them
before they can be used for malicious purposes. In addition to focusing on detection
methods, some researchers are using infiltration to monitor emerging techniques.
To better understand Botnets, their capabilities were studied using static analysis
of the source code so defense strategies could be developed [BaY05]. The overall
architecture of each bot was determined along with the commands used to control bots.
All of the evaluated bots used IRC for command and control. Mechanisms used to
propogate and alter a victim were also detailed. Some bots attempt to patch the system to
defend against other malicious attacks, kill anti-virus software, or harvest information
[BaY05]. Finally, the exploits and attack capabilities of each type of bot was
documented. Commonalities among the bots could be used to develop defense strategies
11

including the “predominant remote control mechanism for botnets IRC.” “Disruption of
specific channels on IRC servers should continue to be an effective defensive strategy.
[BaY05]” “The IRC-based command and control systems remain an area that the
network security community can potentially exploit for defensive purposes. [BaY05].”
The analysis of IRC traffic using Cisco Netflow data is a method to detect botnets
[Rac04]. One characteristic of botnets is a large population of inactive clients. A typical
bot client connects to the server and awaits instructions from the controller. The server
periodically sends a ping to each client and the client responds with a pong. Netflows
from a botnet channel consist exclusively of ping/pong traffic until the controller sends a
command. There were several technical hurdles encountered when trying to identify
botnets through Netflow analysis. Since data is collected at gateway routers, the shear
volume of traffic collected makes analysis difficult. Not all traffic flows were collected;
in some cases 30% of the ping/pong traffic was not captured. The biggest concern was
the high false positive rate. The proposed algorithm incorrectly classified non-pong
traffic as pongs. Without refinement of the algorithm to more accurately identify traffic
of inactive clients, this technique is not practical. The experiment tried to identify
inactive clients, but did not attempt to group them by channel membership. To be useful,
filters or methods would have to be developed based on channel membership to exclude
traffic on channels that exhibit normal IRC characteristics and identifies channels that
contain a preponderance of inactive clients. Netflow data has been used successfully to
get an overview of malware activity and to identify large scale attacks in progress, but
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has not successfully been used to obtain information about emerging threats or detailed
command and control data [Wic06].
One promising detection technique uses the Domain Name System (DNS). Many
bots use Dynamic DNS (DDNS) which are usually third level domains. By examining
DNS requests for third level domains, bots using DDNS can be identified [Dag05].
Current DNS detection methods use blacklists of canonical names associated with botnets
[Kri05]. This method is very labor intensive and requires extensive storage on large
networks. A comprehensive study of DNS analysis to determine its effectiveness for
identifying botnets found the false positive rate to be high and the computations to be
very CPU intensive [Sch06]. Combining DNS analysis with other monitoring devices
was recommended.
Extending the capabilities of network intrusion devices (NIDS) to identify
protocols used on non-standard ports has proved to be successful at identifying bot
infected hosts [DFM06]. Traditional NIDS use port numbers to correlate network traffic
to specific protocols and are often ineffective in identifying botnet related IRC traffic on
non-standard ports or distinguishing regular IRC traffic from botnet traffic. Signatures to
match the protocol regardless of port number were used to identify IRC traffic. A bot
detector was added to the IRC protocol analyzer and used three different types of checks
to flag bot traffic. It checks for “nicks” that match common botnet nickname patterns,
looks for typical botnet commands, and flags connections to known bot servers. This
successfully identified bot infected hosts on the networks being monitored. However,
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this approach relies on signatures of known bots and will not identify bots that do not
conform to known signatures or whose command and control traffic is encrypted.
The goal of infiltrating a botnet is to analyze the command and control structure
so it can be disabled [FrW05]. Tracking down every infected host of a large botnet is
impossible, while removing the ability to control the clients is an achievable goal. This
can be done by shutting down the control server or severing the ability of the controller to
communicate with its clients. Botnets that rely on DDNS can be shut down if the DNS
provider can be convinced to “blackhole” the DNS name. DNS queries for blackholed
addresses are dropped, preventing bots from connecting to their controller. An
alternative is to locate the IP address of the command and control server and get it
removed from the network. This requires the cooperation of the Internet Service Provider
or local law enforcement. Researchers have shown that they can infiltrate and track
botnets [FrW05]. Unfortunately, both these methods of shutting down a botnet require
third party cooperation. However, the ability to determine critical information about the
entire botnet is much more effective than trying to locate individual infected hosts.
2.10 Summary
Botnets threaten critical infrastructures and understanding the techniques used by
bot controllers to avoid detection is essential to defeating the threat. Continued analysis
of emerging trends is needed to develop timely countermeasures.

14

III. Methodology
3.1 Problem Definition
Currently, the primary defense against botnets is prompt patching of vulnerable
systems and antivirus software. Network monitoring can identify infected hosts
attempting to propagate to other systems. However, identifying infected hosts is only the
first step in stopping a botnet. To stop the botnet, either all the infected hosts must be
located and cleaned, or the botnet controller must be identified and eliminated. Locating
and cleaning all the infected hosts is impossible for a large botnet, since the infected hosts
may be located worldwide. This leaves locating and eliminating the controller as the best
option for limiting botnet effectiveness. Botnet researchers have had success eliminating
botnets by working with Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Dynamic Domain Name
Service (DDNS) server operators to shut down controllers once they are found. While
effective, this modus operandi takes considerable time and relies on cooperation between
internet security professionals and commercial entities. Previous research has provided
the tools needed to effectively locate botnet controllers. Still needed is a way to quickly
shut down bot controllers before they can use their networks for malicious purposes. The
primary control server used by botnet operators is an open source IRC Server called
Unreal IRCd [Hon05].

The goal of this research is to find vulnerabilities in Unreal

IRCd that can be used to disrupt the botnet controller’s ability to communicate with its
infected hosts. This research will determine whether vulnerabilities in Unreal IRCd can
be exploited to sever communication and effectively kill a botnet. If a DDOS attack
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using a botnet can be thwarted by attacking the control server, this would provide an
effective defense against a significant network warfare threat.
Static and dynamic analysis are used to examine the source code of Unreal IRCd.
The code will be profiled to identify key components and document data flow. Software
vulnerability scanning tools are used to evaluate the source code for potential
vulnerabilities, which are evaluated to determine the effectiveness of attacks using the
vulnerability to shut down the botnet server.
3.2 Static Analysis
Since Unreal IRCd is an open source project, the source code is readily available.
The code is profiled and key components that perform critical functions are identified by
adding debugging statements to an otherwise default Unreal IRCd server. This provides
a target list of code functions and focuses the vulnerability search on areas of the
software most likely to cause a critical fault. IRC servers only perform a few functions:
adding and deleting clients, channel setup and maintenance, and message passing among
clients. Operations that require operator privileges are not examined since that privilege
level allows the server to be controlled without exploiting a vulnerability. A search of
open source vulnerability databases is conducted to look for known vulnerabilities in
Unreal IRCd. Known vulnerabilities in Unreal IRCd provide insight into the types of
vulnerabilities that are likely to be found in other code segments. Buffer overflow
vulnerabilities found and corrected in one module may be present and unpatched in other
code sections. These initial steps help to focus the search on critical areas of the code and
provide a starting point for performing additional tests on the software.
16

To facilitate code profiling, debugging statements added to each function of the
source code provide a sequential trace of functions called when Unreal is started and
when critical operations are invoked. One of the most important functions in Unreal is
the read_message function. It checks all file descriptors (sockets) for incoming messages
and new connections. For a new connection, the accept function is called. The accept
function creates a socket and assigns a file descriptor to it. The add_connection function
allocates memory for client information and adds the client to its client list. Once the
client is added, its file descriptor is added to the read_set of file descriptors with
messages in the queue to be read. Messages are only added to the queue if their length is
less than 2048 bytes to protect against buffer overflows.
All operations in Unreal are use messages. Before a client can complete the
connection process it sends several messages including authentication information if
required and the client’s nickname. All messages are handled by the same functions
before being passed to specific modules for each message type. Read_packet is called to
get the contents of messages from the read_set. Read_packet enforces message rules
based on client type. Servers are allowed to send messages without restriction, while
regular users are limited. Read_message enforces a limit of 2048 bytes per message, and
read_packet ensures users do not send a large number of small messages to flood the
server. If a user’s queues contain multiple messages that exceed the maximum limit
(6090 bytes), the user receives an attempted flood message and is disconnected. Another
buffer overflow mechanism found in read_packet checks for the presence of a carriage
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return or line feed. If read_packet processes 512 bytes without finding one, it adds one
and flushes the rest of the buffer.
Once read_packet has transferred the message to the read buffer, do_packet
collects statistical data and calls the parsing function for the message. The functions to
add a client and process messages were examined carefully to look for buffer overflow
opportunities. Since these functions process any data sent to the client it is critical that
they are secure. Unreal uses multiple checks to ensure buffers are not overrun with data.
In addition to the checks mentioned earlier, Unreal also limits the number of connections
from a single IP address and the number of connection attempts allowed per unit of time
is also limited.
After examining how Unreal handles incoming connections and monitors traffic
for buffer overflow attempts and flooding, the routines to handle individual messages and
commands was analyzed. After read_message has placed the incoming message in a
buffer and do_packet collects the statistics, parse is called. Parse receives as input
pointers to the client structure that sent the message and to the beginning and end of the
message. The first thing parse does is extract the command from the message. The
command is the first word in every message. When entering text into an IRC client, users
must use a slash (/) before entering a command into the chat window. If no slash is
detected by the client, it prefixes the command PRIVMSG onto the text entered to
indicate that it is a text message. The parse function looks for the first space in the
message and takes everything prior to the space to be the command. The command is
matched against a hash table that stores all allowed Unreal commands. If the command is
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not found an error message is sent and the buffer is cleared. If the command is found a
pointer to the command structure is returned. The command structure indicates how
many parameters the command takes and the type of user that can invoke the command.
Some commands may only be invoked by an operator or a server. Parse checks to see if
the sender is authorized to use the command and then divides the message into
parameters with spaces again being the delimiters. If the total number of parameters is
reached the rest of the message is stuck in the last parameter. The command structure
also specifies the module that processes the command since each Unreal command is
handled by a separate module.
The parse function and the modules that handle commands are examined to
determine if there were format string vulnerabilities or input validation weaknesses that
could be exploited. Unreal is not vulnerable to format string vulnerabilities because it
does not do any processing on the strings that are supplied. Inserting escape characters or
using hex encoding has no effect on the way the messages are handled. Input validation
vulnerabilities and code injection attempts are also thwarted by the fact that Unreal does
not do any pre-processing of the input. Attempts to inject code are interpreted as the text
for a command or a command parameter.
After determining how Unreal handled attempts to insert format strings, code, and
encoded input each module was examined to see how they handled missing parameters,
encoded input, and extra data. Examples of common IRC commands include NICK,
USER, JOIN, PASS, and PRIVMSG. The NICK command supplies the name to be
displayed to others on an IRC server. The module that processes NICK commands
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ensures that exactly two parameters are supplied unless the connection is from a linked
server specified in the configuration file. The length of the nickname is checked against a
specified maximum and is rejected if it exceeds it. The supplied name is also checked
against a list of disallowed (blacklist) and allowed (whitelist) characters. This is a very
effective method for eliminating malicious input.
The USER command is used in conjunction with the NICK command to provide
additional information about the connecting client. Again, the number of parameters is
checked to ensure that the correct number has been supplied and if any are NULL.
Usernames are limited to numbers (0-9) and characters from allowed language sets along
with the dash and period. Any other characters including control characters cause an
error and the user is disconnected. A special function checks the IP address supplied and
verifies it with socket data.
The JOIN function specifies a channel or channels that a user wants to join. The
function ensures that there are enough parameters and the channel name is not NULL. A
pound (#) sign is required and an error is returned if it is not present. Optional
parameters are also verified.
The PASS command is used if the server you are connecting to requires a
password and only takes two parameters. The function checks the password length
against a specified maximum and stores it to use later by a separate authorization
function. If the password does not match the client is disconnected.
PRIVMSG sends text messages to a channel or individual clients. The function
checks for enough parameters, both a message and a receiver must be specified. Hash
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tables are used to look up users and/or channels. No interpretation is done on the
message, so any attempts to encode the message have no effect.
Every command that users may invoke was checked to ensure that it handled
missing parameters or extra data and that control characters or command injection would
not result in malicious code being run on the system. Operator commands were not
verified since users with operator privileges are able to control the server.
Software vulnerability scanning tools identify more potential software
vulnerabilities. Splint is a tool used to statically check C programs for security
vulnerabilities and syntax errors. When used to evaluate the Unreal IRCd source code,
Splint identified over 8,000 potential vulnerabilities. This high number is the result of
Splint checking for coding errors as well as security vulnerabilities. Many of the items
flagged by Splint might concern a programmer without opening a security hole.
Examples of common errors that Splint caught included initializing a variable to NULL
(885 errors) and using a non-boolean operand with a boolean operator (1455 errors).
While Splint caught many trivial code issues, it also caught some potentially
serious ones. Splint identified 22 instances where unsafe functions were used. Many
early C functions are vulnerable to buffer overflows if used improperly and have been
replaced by safer versions. Splint identified instances in the Unreal code where the
unsafe versions of functions such as Sprintf were being used. Sprintf is susceptible to
buffer overflows if format specifiers are present or users are able to manipulate the input
to the function. A review of the source code containing the vulnerable functions showed
that care was taken to use them properly. Input to the functions came from the system
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not the user. Format strings were only used for data that had a known range of values.
There was no opportunity to inject malicious values into the functions and cause the
system to crash.
Another prevalent problem was suspected memory leaks. Splint flagged over one
thousand potential memory leaks where “allocated storage was not released before
return” or “incomplete deallocation of a structure or deep pointer is suspected.”
Dynamic analysis is used to check for memory leaks during Unreal IRCd operation.
Memory leaks could potentially lead to memory exhaustion and be used to shut down the
server.
All Splint errors that identified potential security holes were evaluated manually
to determine if they could be exploited to gain unauthorized access or crash the system.
None of the potential vulnerabilities found could be used to crash the server or interrupt
communication.
3.3 Dynamic Analysis
The dynamic portion of the analysis is checks for memory leaks and attempts to
exhaust the system memory, causing Unreal IRCd to stop. To test memory performance,
an automated method of rapidly connecting to the Unreal server using unique Internet
addresses is required unless a large botnet can be used to initiate connections. Unreal
limits the total number of connections per address and the number of connection attempts
per address per unit of time. Hping is a network security testing tool that can assemble
and capture packets. Using Hping, source addresses can be spoofed and hundreds of
client connections to Unreal can be initiated without having access to hundreds of
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computer systems. During testing, Hping generates large numbers of SYN packets,
initiating three way handshakes with the target server. Responses from the server are
captured and used to generate the proper sequence of packets to create a full client
connection to Unreal. Each connection, in addition to having different addresses, must
also provide a unique nickname and user data. After a connection has been established, it
may be terminated or left open depending on the test that is being conducted. Hping’s
scripting capability provides the ability to build and send packets based on data extracted
from packets received.
3.4 System Boundaries
The system under test is the suite of tools and techniques used to discover
potential vulnerabilities in the Unreal IRCd software (Figure 1). This system is called the
Unreal IRCd Evaluation System. Critical code segments identified during code profiling
are examined via manual and automated methods for potential avenues of exploitation.
Software vulnerability scanning is used to identify other possible code vulnerabilities.

Figure 1: System Under Test
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Potential vulnerabilities are examined and exploits to target the vulnerability are
developed if the vulnerability appears to be exploitable. The component under test is
Unreal IRCd. Potential exploits and vulnerabilities are tested by generating packets that
target the vulnerability and sending them to the Unreal IRCd server.
3.5 System Services
The Unreal IRCd Evaluation System identifies potential vulnerabilities in Unreal
IRCd and tests them using a packet generator. The system provides multiple ways of
evaluating Unreal IRCd when attempting to find vulnerabilities. Code profiling identifies
critical portions of the software that are evaluated using manual methods and software
scanning tools to find coding errors and security vulnerabilities.
3.6 Workload
Packets generated using Hping comprise the workload for the system. Hping
sends crafted packets identical to packets generated by a normal IRC chat client. Hping’s
packet capturing function is used to analyze response packets from the Unreal IRCd
server. The only modification to the Unreal IRCd server was to create a static address
resolution protocol (ARP) table, so all server responses would be sent to the attack
system running Hping. Using spoofed source addresses, one computer is used to
generate connections that would normally require thousands of clients.
3.7 Performance Metrics
The only performance metric tracked is memory utilization. Static analysis of the
source code indicated that memory management might be a significant vulnerability in
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Unreal IRCd. Using dynamic analysis, memory utilization is measured using operating
system queries while connection attempts are sent to Unreal IRCd.
3.8 Parameters
Parameters of this experiment include the hardware used and operating system
(OS) choice. An early decision was made to use Linux as the operating system. A
precompiled version of Unreal IRCd for Windows is available, but using the Linux
version provided access to the source code. Altering the source code to insert debugging
statements aided code profiling. An unaltered version is used for dynamic analysis
experiments. Linux limits the number of open files per process to 1024. This affected
any tests requiring more than 1024 connections. To increase the number of files allowed,
a kernel variable must be changed and the kernel recompiled which is unlikely in fielded
versions of Unreal IRCd on Linux.
The attack system and the Unreal IRCd server are standalone computers on a
private network. Only traffic generated by the two systems is on the 100Mbps network.
The hardware specifications for the Unreal IRCd server are provided in Table 1.

Table 1: Unreal IRCd Hardware Specifications
CPU

Intel Pentium 4 (3 GHz, 800MHz FSB)

Memory

512 MB SDRAM

OS

Fedora Core 6
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3.9 Factors
There are two factors used in the experiments run during dynamic analysis, the
number of connections and the connection type. Two different types of connections
were used. For one set of experiments, clients connected and immediately closed the
connection. This experiment checks for the potential memory leaks indicated by the
static analysis. The other type of connection was persistent. Unreal IRCd was
bombarded with client connections which were not terminated. This set of experiments
was designed to check memory utilization. The factors chosen and the levels for the
experiments are summarized in Table 2.

Factor
Connections
Connection Type

Table 2: Factors and their levels
Levels
1,000/2,500/5,000/10,000
10,000/20,000/30,000/40,000/50,000
10,000/25,000/50,000/75,000/100,000
Transient/ Persistent

3.10 Evaluation Technique
Performance is evaluated by direct measurement. More accurate results can be
obtained using actual servers rather than a simulator or analytic model. The attack
system generates connection attempts and responds appropriately to Unreal IRCd server
responses. Wireshark, a network sniffer, monitors communication between the clients
and server to validate that the attack system and server are interacting properly. At
prescribed intervals based on the number of connection attempts, the operating system of
the Unreal IRCd server is polled using a “ps aux” command to obtain memory utilization
statistics. These statistics are recorded for later analysis.
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3.11 Experimentation Design
Memory utilization for each type of connection is measured for each connection
level. If memory utilization continues to increase without bound, additional experiments
are conducted until utilization peaks, the server crashes, or stops responding to client
requests. The experiments are replicated three times to account for any variation due to
network and system anomalies. Since the experiments are conducted in a controlled lab
environment, variance is expected to be very low.
3.12 Summary
Static analysis of Unreal IRCd is conducted using a variety of tools to evaluate
vulnerabilities. Dynamic analysis is used to evaluate the significance of the
vulnerabilities and the feasibility of exploiting them to interrupt communication between
a botnet and the control server.
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IV. Analysis and Results
4.1 Results and Analysis of Individual Measures
The first series of experiments check for memory leaks in Unreal IRCd. During
static analysis using Splint, memory management issues triggered a high number of
alerts. Using Hping, connections were established to the server, a channel was joined,
and then the client closes the connection. If memory leaks are present, the memory
footprint of Unreal should increase as the total number of connections increases. Unreal
IRCd was restarted before every run of the experiments. Before any connections were
made, Unreal IRCd used either 3800 Kilobytes (K) or 3804K of memory. This indicates
that there is a memory leak issue since 4K of memory is not always released. The first
factor level tested was 10,000 connections, and the results of this experiment are shown
in Figure 2.
Memory Usage Closed Connections
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Figure 2: Memory Utilization with 10,000 Closed Connections
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At 2,500 connections and under, there is no increase in memory footprint.
Between 2,500 and 5,000 memory usage increases 28K. The only difference seen in the
memory usage between the three runs was the initial 4K difference present after restart.
The 28K increase in memory utilization should not occur and indicates that there is a
memory issue with Unreal IRCd. Since every connection is closed, the structures used to
hold client information should be deleted and the memory freed. If Unreal IRCd
continues to use memory without freeing it all, it will eventually consume all the system
memory resources and cause the system to shut down or lock up. For the next
experiment the connections were increased to 50,000 to see if additional memory would
be allocated. The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Memory Utilization with 50,000 Closed Connections
As seen in the graph, memory usage did not increase. The amount of memory
used between 10,000 and 50,000 connections remained the same. The next series of runs
increased the connections to 100,000 with the results presented in Figure 4.
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Memory Usage Closed Connections
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Figure 4: Memory Utilization with 100,000 Closed Connections

Again, there was no additional increase in memory footprint. One additional
experiment was run with 500,000 connections to verify that memory usage remained at
this level, and the results did not indicate any increased usage at that level either.
The first group of experiments shows that there were minor memory management
issues with Unreal IRCd. When Unreal IRCd is stopped, some memory may not be
released. This amount of memory is always 4K, so it is not a significant amount.
Additionally, Unreal IRCd uses an additional 28K after approximately 2,500 connections.
This is additional memory that should be freed, however, since Unreal IRCd never
consumes additional resources it is not a serious issue.
The next series of experiments test another aspect of memory management in
Unreal IRCd. For these experiments, connections are established with the Unreal IRCd
server, but were not closed. These experiments should result in a larger memory
footprint for Unreal IRCd since memory will be allocated to store client data and for the
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queues used to receive data from the clients. The first experiment involved 10,000
connection attempts with the results recorded in Figure 5.
Memory Usage Attempted Connections
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Figure 5: Memory Utilization with 10,000 Attempted Connections

As shown in the graph, memory usage has peaked at 2,500 connections and
remains the same through 10,000 connections. An analysis of the network traffic
captures provided the explanation. After 1,023 connections Unreal IRCd stopped
allowing new connections until previous connections timed out and were closed. The
Unreal IRCd configuration allows the total number of connections to be specified by the
administrator, but Linux only allowed 1,024 open files per process. Unreal IRCd
continues to accept connection requests, but instead of allocating memory it replies with
an error message.
There is a large increase in memory usage between 1,000 and 2,500 connection
attempts that cannot be attributed to the 24 additional connections allowed after the data
was gathered at 1,000 connections. After the maximum number of connections is
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reached, Unreal IRCd is only handling connections that it eventually denies. Additional
memory usage must be caused by overhead associated with replying to new connection
attempts. Two additional experiments were conducted with 50,000 and 100,000 attempts
to see if Unreal IRCd could be overwhelmed with new connection attempts. These
results are presented in Figures 6 and 7.
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Figure 6: Memory Utilization with 50,000 Attempted Connections
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Figure 7: Memory Utilization with 100,000 Attempted Connections
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As seen in Figure 6 and 7, memory usage does not increase no matter how many
new connection attempts are sent to Unreal IRCd.
This series of experiments demonstrates that an attack designed to exhaust the
server’s memory is unlikely to be effective unless the server administrator alters the
kernel to allow a larger number of connections than the operating system can handle, or
use an operating system that does not limit open files.

The number of allowed

connections would have to be large enough to allow the server to exhaust all available
resources.
4.2 Summary
The experiments in this section test potential memory management vulnerabilities
identified during static analysis by Splint. While the experiments show that there were
minor issues with memory management by Unreal IRCd, the vulnerability is not
significant enough interrupt communication between the server and its clients.

33

V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Overview and Conclusions
The source code and operation of Unreal IRCd was studied using static and
dynamic analysis to identify vulnerabilities. A critical vulnerability in Unreal IRCd
could be used to shut down a server directing an attack, providing an effective defense
against a growing botnet threat. Analysis revealed that Unreal IRCd is a very mature and
stable IRC server. The lack of documented vulnerabilities in the software is indicative of
the obvious effort to provide a secure and robust platform. Comments in the source code
indicate that security was an important consideration of the programmers. While this
research does not eliminate the possibility that a critical vulnerability is present in the
Unreal IRCd software, none were identified during this effort.
5.2 Recommendations for Future Research
Analysis of the Unreal IRCd server did not identify a critical vulnerability that
could be exploited to shut down the controller. However, the possibility exists to hamper
communication through DDOS attacks. DDOS attacks are one of the most devastating
uses of botnets, but also might be used to interrupt or stop an attack. Can a methodology
be developed to attack the control server with bogus connections or IRC requests that
prevent the server from issuing commands or receiving data from its clients? All IRCd
servers have limits on the number of bots they can support. It may be feasible to clone
harmless bots that emulate the botmaster’s clients and reduce the effectiveness of an
attack. Bots might also be engineered to provide false or misleading data to their
controllers as part of a counterintelligence measure.
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Botnets are a significant and growing threat to our networks and data. Relying on
software vendors to develop patches to fix vulnerabilities will never eliminate the threat,
software developers and anti-virus vendors are always playing catch-up with hackers.
Developing effective botnet countermeasures is critical to protect our networked assets
and ensure their availability.
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